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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationships between the effectiveness of Shariah supervisory board (SSB), their 
remuneration and mode of financing Islamic bank. The SSB effectiveness is evaluated by an index based on 9 
attributes score. This study comprises 18 Islamic banks in which operating in Malaysia from the year 2012 to 
2013 as a sample. Our regression analysis shows that the effectiveness of SSB does not concern with the mode 
of Islamic bank financing. However, we found that SSB remuneration and bank’s financial growth shown a 
positive and significant relationship with mode of financing. The implications of these findings are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a strong debut on the Islamic mode of financing which do not underlie with the banner 
of Islamic banking in which constitutes the elimination of injustices of the interest-based system as 
ordained by Holy Qur'an1. According to [1], [2] and [3] the current mode of financing still cannot be 
expected to completely free from the injustices of the interest-based system or to contribute to the 
achievement of socioeconomic objectives which Islam seeks to achieve. Although there are many 
views can be discussed towards the mode of financing adopted by the Islamic banks, this study aims 
to explain whether Shariah supervisory boards (SSB) and their remuneration have any significant 
influence towards the choices of Islamic banks mode of financing. Based on the work of [4] who 
suggested that, SSB plays an important role, particularly in harmonizing the Islamic rules and 
guidelines in Islamic banks (i.e. Shariah-compliance gatekeeper), this study argues that the choices 
of style of financing by Islamic banks should be tempted by this board as to avoid any injustices as 
what has been proposed in Shariah Law. In other words, the SSB should put highly concern with 
regard to any mode of financing by the Islamic bank in which are not aligned with the profit- sharing 
principles.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Islamic mode of financing drawbacks 
 According to [5] there are five drawbacks of Murabahah mode of financing. First, on the matter of 
                                                 
1 The Holy Qur’an versus 2:275 and 3:130. 
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ownership and ownership whereby bank has been claimed not actually purchase the asset prior to 
sale. Second, is on the issue of Murabahah’s pricing mechanism. Third, is on the extent profit 
determination with consideration of time value of money with a fixed compensation since the 
Murabahah deals with instalment sale. Fourth, the issue of customer defaulted toward Murabahah 
facility. Fifth, refer to the liability of an asset that found defective upon delivery and lastly is on the 
principle of al- kharaj bil daman that being applied in the contract.  
2.2 Shariah Governance 
According to [6], Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) is one of internal governance mechanisms 
which involves the monitoring of Islamic banks' activities in accordance to the Sharia (i.e. Islamic 
law) specifically on its implementation and compliance. It is a part of the big corporate governance 
framework and what makes it different is only by the existence of Shariah Supervisory Board or 
Shariah Supervisory Committee or Shariah unit [7]. Since Shariah governance is part of corporate 
governance, thus, good and effective SSB should reflect the issue of independence, transparent, 
accountable, responsible, and fair [8]. In this context, studies by [9] and [10], argued that the unique 
attributes of SSB must be clarified as to incorporating SSB as part of corporate governance 
mechanisms framework. Although the existence of SSB seemed able to monitor Islamic banking 
activities, there are still Islamic banks have experienced failure similar to that of conventional in the 
recent year. Supposedly, by the attaining of Shariah and good corporate governance, Islamic bank 
basically able to achieve Shariah objectives (i.e., Maqasid Shariah). However, having this kind of 
committee is sort not like providing reliable Shariah Governance in which utmost important and 
beneficial to all parties inside and outside the Islamic Banks.  
3. Hypotheses Development 
This study uses agency theory as underpinning theory to develop the hypotheses. The following 
hypotheses have been developed in this study: 
H1 There is positive relationships between the effectiveness of SSB and mode of financing 
adopted by the Islamic bank. 
H2 There is no significant relationship between SSB remuneration and mode of financing 
adopted by the Islamic bank. 
   
4. Methodology 
The sample used in this study comprises 18 Islamic banks in which operating in Malaysia from the 
year 2012 till 2014. To extract the mode of financing and information about SSB (i.e., effectiveness 
and remuneration), the annual reports of Islamic bank were scrutinized.  The dependent variable of 
this study denoted as MODE is proxy by Bai Bhithaman Ajil to total Finance. This study measured 
SSB effectiveness based on 9 attributes scored in which aggregately measured. The attributes is 
captured based on four elements of effectiveness which is proposed in conventional corporate 
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governance model [11, 12]. These elements are 1) composition, 2) adequate authority, 3) resources 
and 4) diligence.  Since Shariah governance is part of corporate governance model [7], the use of this 
elements can be assumed valid.  
 
Table 1. Measurement of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Composition of variables 
MODE : Bai Bhithaman Ajil to Total Finance 
SSBEFF : SSB effectiveness Index = Company’s actual score on RMC characteristics/ 
company total possible score of RMC characteristics 
SSBREMU : Log of Total Remuneration 
FGROWT
H 
: Log of total finance 
PROF : Number of RMC meetings during the financial year 
MSUPP : M2 plus financial assets 
GDP : Growth rate of real GDP 
ε   : Error term 
 
 
To examine the relationship between SSB effectiveness, remuneration, control variables and the 
mode of financing, a multiple linear regression is performed. The regression model is built as follows: 
MODEi = αi+β1SSBEFFi +β2SSBREMUi +β3FGROWTHi+β4PROFi+β5MSUPPi+ β6GDPi  +εi      
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The results of descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table 2. The average of MODE is 
53 percent indicating that more than half of the total finance is dominated by Bai bhithaman Ajil. 
The mean score of 0.7857 for SSBEFF indicates that on average, SSB in Malaysia quite effective. 
On average, all the SSB members are being paid off RM518, 346 annually, however, there are some 
bank that did not disclose the SSB remuneration clearly.  
Table 2. Descriptive Results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the outcomes of the regression analysis between the mode of financing, SSB 
N=42 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
MODE .5295 .23113 
SSBEFF .7857 .06639 
SSBREMU 12.7312 .78972 
FGROWTH 16.1884 1.25395 
PROF .0864 .02689 
MSUPP 2.300 .5959 
GDP 8.300 1.0054 
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effectiveness and control variables. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics indicate that 
multicollinearity does not exist in the model as the values are less than 10. The model explains 22.3 
percent of the variation towards the mode of financing, which is relatively low. Although the adjusted 
R2 is low, the finding is consistent with those of the previous governance studies, which pointed out 
that the low R2 is common in corporate governance researches [see 10, 13]. Our analysis show that 
SSBEFF do not have a significant relationship with mode of financing, but there are significant 
relationship between SSBREMU and FGROWTH. Table 3 shows that SSBREMU (t value = -0.029) 
has a significant and positive relationship with the mode of Islamic bank financing, at p < 0.1 in 
which indicates that the increase in BBA moves in tandem with the increase in SSB’s remuneration. 
In this respect H2 is rejected.  Thus, we support the notion that there is no serious effort was taken 
to implement the profit and loss sharing mode of financing among Islamic bank [1, 2, 4]. It’s not a 
matter of SSB effectiveness, but it seems that their remuneration may determine the preferences 
toward BBA and Murabahah mode of financing. This might hold a truth since we find that there is 
an insignificant portion of these asset portfolios is mainly dominated by murabahah, BBA and other 
than profit and loss mode of financing. In addition, judging from the FGROWTH that is positively 
significant to MODE as reported, we also perceive that the trade-based mode of financing that must 
be applied temporarily by the Islamic bank as for their transition phase is not much concern after 25 
years, it sort like they are maximizing the shareholder wealth.  Another possible explanation is that 
the SSB committee members may have a relationship with the management as to remain their long 
period as committee members. As a result to this, we perceive that their assessment may have been 
influenced by the management since their appointment as committee member is merely due to their 
relationship with the company.  
Table 3. Regression Results 
      Note: ***Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level, **signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *signiﬁcant at 0.1 level. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to examine the influence of SSB effectiveness and their 
remuneration to the choices of Islamic mode of financing by Malaysian Islamic bank. The analysis 
shows that an effective SSB does not have significant bearing towards the choice of Islamic mode of 
Model  
Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. SE t Sig. VIF 
(Constant)  -1.454 1.077 -1.350 .186 - 
SSBEFF + -.017 0.574 -.029 .977 1.322 
SSBREMU 0 .086 .049 1.774 .085* 1.338 
Control Variables 
FGROWTH + .067 .038 1.775 .085* 2.032 
PROF + .724 1.614 .448 .657 1.716 
MSUPP +/- -.058 .089 -.648 .521 2.574 
GDP +/- -.013 .055 -.245 .808 2.774 
R2  0.228                        P value             0.059  
Adjusted R2 0.203                        N                      42 
F statistic  2.275                        
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financing in Malaysia but their remuneration have. Intrinsically, this finding might give some insight 
towards the notion of ‘cosmetic reason’ [14] for regulator, policy maker and another researcher on 
the effectiveness and the existence of SSB in Malaysia especially when incorporating SSBs as part 
of the corporate governance mechanism.  
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